We show that partially trusting the phase noise associated with estimation uncertainty in a LLO-CVQKD system allows one to exchange higher secure key rates than in the case of untrusted phase noise. However, this opens a security loophole through the manipulation of the reference pulse amplitude. We label this as 'reference pulse attack' which is applicable to all LLO-CVQKD systems if the phase noise is trusted. We show that, at the optimal reference pulse intensity level, Eve achieves unity attack efficiency at 23.8km and 32.0km while using lossless and 0.14dB/km loss channels, respectively, for her attack. However, in order to maintain the performance enhancement from partially trusting the phase noise, countermeasures have been proposed. As a result, the LLO-CVQKD system with partially trusted phase noise owns a superior key rate at 20km by an order 9.5, and extended transmission distance by 45%, than that of the phase noise untrusted system.
Introduction
The aim of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to promise theoretically validated information security between two authenticated users, Alice and Bob. This is achieved by sharing common random secure keys which are unknown to an eavesdropper-Eve [1] [2] [3] [4] . Continuous Variable (CV) based QKD has rapidly developed in recent years [5] [6] [7] and its protocols take advantage of the properties of light associated with its wave nature. Here keys are encoded on amplitude and phase jointly referred as quadrature, of the light which can be extracted by shot noise limited coherent detection. The primary advantage of CVQKD is its compatibility with standard off-the-shelf optical communication components which could enable more affordable QKD networks [8] . In addition, while comparing with dedicated single-photon detector based discrete variable (DV) QKD systems, CVQKD systems are efficient and have higher secure key rates over access and metro dense wavelength division multiplexed (DWDM) networks [9] [10] [11] . Amongst number of CVQKD protocols, Gaussian-modulated coherent-state (GMCS) CVQKD having been rigorously studied and shown to provide unconditional security against malicious eavesdropping attacks [12, 13] . However, imperfections in real CVQKD systems result in potential loopholes that compromise the secure key generation. For example, attacks that exploit the intensity fluctuations of the local oscillator (LO) [14] , the wavelength dependency of the homodyne beam splitter [15] , and the saturation of the homodyne detector [16] have been identified and respective counter measures have been proposed.
The Local Local Oscillator (LLO) CVQKD system, proposed and demonstrated in [17] [18] [19] , obviates the need for direct transmission of a LO and thereby nullifies the scope for direct or indirect attacks on the LO. This is achieved by using independent narrow linewidth lasers of the same center wavelength, one at Alice for signal generation and the other at Bob for local oscillator use. However, agreeing a common phase reference between the two free running lasers is an experimental challenge. In order to ease such a limitation, Alice can share low intensity phase reference pulses with Bob, that can either lock the phase of the LO laser with the one at Alice in real time [20] or otherwise can recover the phase and corrects the measurements later during data reconciliation [21] . The latest LLO implementations based simultaneous pilot's signals [22] , polarization multiplexed pilots [23] and more detailed noise analysis [24] also comes to the stage.
Due to the relatively low intensity, the quantum uncertainty associated with the reference pulse's phase estimation induces a phase estimation error in Bob's quadrature measurement. The phase drift due to the laser spectral linewidth also contributes to the phase noise. Conventionally, in order to upper bound the information leakage, it is assumed that phase noise is originated from Eve. This may not be necessary since some part of the phase noise sources can be well identified, calibrated and hence trusted i.e., they are not originated from eavesdropping.
A refined noise model to enhance the phase noise tolerance in LLO-CVQKD has recently been studied in [25] where phase estimation error noise can be locally calibrated and treated as trusted noise while the phase drift noise is still regarded as untrusted. In this model, significant increment in achievable secret key rate and transmission distance has been predicted [17, 21] . Moreover, in [23] , we find that the phase variation arise from signal and pilot pulses separation inside Bob is also isolated from Eve, hence certain trusted phase noise and predicted improved performance. Nevertheless, security analysis with trusted phase noise has not been comprehensively investigated and we have therefore found that amplituderelated phase estimation error noise can result in a loophole for Eve to mount an attack.
In this paper, we explore LLO-CVQKD system performance under trusted-referred as realistic, and untrusted-referred as paranoid, security model of phase noise and show the enhancement in secure key rate. And then propose an attack that exploits the phase estimation error associated with the amplitude of the phase reference pulses. The corresponding reduction in phase estimation error leave freedom for Eve to obtain a considerably larger amount of secret key information than that estimated by Alice and Bob, under realistic security model. We call this attack the "reference pulse attack". In the proposed countermeasure, we re-visit the phase noise that can be trusted conditioned on the amount of attack that Eve can mount and then bound her accessible information. As a result, performance is degraded but is better than that of paranoid security model. This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we briefly describe the LLO-CVQKD system and demonstrate assumption of the trusted phase noise model and performance. In section III, we present the reference pulse attack and we revisit the expression for the mutual information under the reference pulse attack. In section IV, we compare the attack performance under the paranoid and realistic security conditions. We then optimize the trusted phase noise model to provide a countermeasure to the attack. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section V.
The LLO CVQKD System
In this section, we describe the implementation of the LLO-CVQKD system and the current state-of-art noise model. We focus on the phase noise, especially the phase estimation error noise, to reveal the loophole.
LLO CVQKD principle
As shown in Fig. 1 , a practical LLO-CVQKD system using the GMCS protocol can be analysed in four parts: Alice's preparation, channel propagation, Bob's detection and data post processing.
First This follows the generally accepted trusted detector noise assumption in practical CVQKD system [24] [25] [26] . Meanwhile, esti ξ is determined at the trusted detector and can be locally calibrated at Bob. To achieve pre-calibration, one can use training pulse sessions, as used in classical coherent communications, to estimate total noise and then the calibration of phase estimation noise which can assumed to be constant during the protocol run. Therefore, esti ξ is assumed as trusted detector noise. However, it is hard to verify the randomness of phase drift noise drift ξ associated with two independent lasers [22] so it is assumed as untrusted noise.
Based on these two assumptions, the quadrature values measured by Bob under trusted phase noise can be written as:
N X and N P are vacuum quadratures with unit shot noise variance ( 0 N ). ele X and ele P are electronic noise quadratures with variance ele V . In the Eq. (7), the rotation matrix in the first term accounts for the phase estimation error while the X ξ and P ξ represent the noise due to Eve's attack.
Trusted phase noise model performance analysis
Secret key formula pertaining to the LLO-CVQKD scheme follows exactly that for a conventional CVQKD scheme. Under a collective attack [3] with reverse reconciliation, the asymptotic secure key rate is:
Where β is the reconciliation efficiency and AB I is the mutual information between Alice and Bob while BE χ is the upper bound of Eve's information related to the Holevo bound [27] .
Before we detail the Eq.8 further, we describe the noise nomenclatures used in its expansion. This is important to comprehend the basic difference in the key rate estimation under trusted and untrusted noise model. The trusted phase noise model does not change any derivation procedure rather attribute the trusted noise differently in the parameters involved. This as follows.
As mentioned in previous section, the phase estimation error noise esti ξ in trusted phase noise model is treated as part of the trusted detector noise het ε while the rest of phase noisephase drift noise drift ξ and other noises such as AM dynamic range related noise AM ξ [21] and ADC quantization noise ADC ξ [23] are untrusted. The trusted phase noise model does not change the estimation procedure of the eigenvalues. Based on the heterodyne detection for reference and signals, the noise induced by detector under such noise model is expressed as:
The total line noise induced in channel containing all untrusted noise referred to channel input is
In comparison, overall phase noise is considered to be controlled by Eve in conventional paranoid security model and esti ξ is treated as part of excess noise. Therefore, ε , u stands for untrusted, can be obtained as:
The overall noise referred to the channel input, in trusted noise model, is shown:
This is also true for untrusted noise case. From the Shannon equation [28] , with heterodyne detection can be derived through:
Furthermore, the accessed information by Eve χ is evaluated using the Von Neumann entropy S(.) [29] :
For the GMCS protocol, the Von Neumann entropy is analysed using the symplectic eigenvalues [30] [31] of the covariance matrix. The derivation χ in LLO-CVQKD system [17] follows exactly same as that of conventional CV-QKD, with added phase noise from reference pulse as well as laser phase drift. In our estimation, since we have considered the phase estimation error noise is trusted and part of detection noise, it is adequate to follow the same procedure. The mutual information between Eve and Bob is given by:
where G(x) = (x + 1) log (x + 1) − xlog x and the eigenvalues λ , = ± √ − 4
Considering that heterodyne detection, λ , , , can be written by λ , = ± √ − 4 and λ = 1 with
The simulation for performance comparison is conducted with parameters selected to match with the parameters used in recent LLO-CVQKD experiments [17, 19] , which are: V = 4 , = 0.95 , = 0.5 ,attenuation coefficient α = 0.2 dB/km , V = 0.01 , ξ = 0.01, f = 100 MHz, = 1.9 , AM extinction ratio is 40dB and quantization number of the ADC is 11 bits. Among this parameter, most importantly, the intensity of reference pulse needs to be chosen carefully to achieve the best system performance. Too weak reference pulse intensity will introduce large phase noise due to shot noise. On the other hand, even though large reference pulse intensity leads to low phase estimation error noise. However, other noises such as modulation noise due to finite amplitude modulation range and polarization multiplexing device's dynamic range [25] , ADC noise [23] , etc. will correspondingly increase with reference pulse intensity. The best performance under untrusted phase noise model is around the intensity that expressed in signal variance is = 100~150 in LLO-CVQKD system. We set = 100 is as the optimal value in our comparison; also used in ref [25] .
As the results shown in Fig. 3 , since the trusted phase noise is not regarded as part of the excess noise, it has significantly improved key rate and distance performance to 99.8km. The paranoid security model usually overestimates excess noise, hence Eve's information, resulting in extremely limited system performance to 18.7km. This indicates that relaxations on existing stringent security assumption will lead to better QKD system performance. However, this security assumptions may open new vulnerabilities and potential side channels. Here is no difference; we have identified an attack in trusted LLO-CVQKD system. We explain this in the following section. Fig. 3 . Secret key rate comparison of the realistic and paranoid security noise model. The simulation parameters are selected to match the parameters used in recent LLO-CVQKD experiments [17] . Alice modulation variance V A =4 and reference pulse intensity E /V = 100 3. Reference pulse attack under trusted phase noise
Reference pulse attack model
In CVQKD, the parameter estimation procedure allows Alice to estimate only the overall excess noise tot ξ value as a single parameter value. It has contributions from several individual noise sources which are practically impossible to distinguish. Consequently, the variation in the noise contribution from individual noise sources cannot be detected if the tot ξ is kept unchanged. We exploit this vulnerability to propose the reference pulse attack. This attack is focused on LLO-CVQKD system with trusted phase noise where the phase noise value is calibrated in advance.
The fundamental plan of the reference pulse attack is to manipulate the individual excess noise contributions without altering tot ξ . The attack works as follows. Eve increase her amount of attack on the quantum signal, which inevitably increase the excess noise. However, at the same ti the amplitude in the parame leaves eve to Without lo optic impleme in Fig. 4 
As explained earlier, the first two noise terms ( 
Here, the phase estimator is more accurate than one in Eq. (7). The most powerful impact of our attack is the applicability on every LLO-CVQKD configuration as long as phase estimation error noise is trusted. Attack creates excess noise tolerance and information leakage to Eve without being noticed. Even 100% secret key can be gained by Eve through this attack. In the following section, we estimate Eve's gain in secure key information during the attack.
Secret key analysis under attack
In this section, we compare the mutual information and Holevo bound among the estimated values in trusted model without attack ( and ) , with attack ( and ) and actual information access by Eve in trusted model under attack ( ). Based on eq. (23), the total noise estimated by Alice and Bob after attack, , is identical to the 'no' attack situation χ in untrusted model. This indicates that the attack, as in Eq. (13), does not affect the mutual information between Alice and Bob which can be referred to as:
Similarly, with pre-calibrated phase estimation error noise, Alice and Bob are unable to discover the individual change of esti ξ and drift ξ as long as the total added noise tot ξ remains the same. Therefore, two users still employ previous noise values for Eve's information estimation where = and = , hence = . However, the actual line and detector noise terms through attack can be expressed as:
where excess noise attack e ξ equals tole ξ .
As a result, following the exact procedure from Eq. (14) to Eq. (20) in the trusted phase noise model, Eve's gain in information is greater than due to her additional attack on the signal. This leads to > = . Here we define the efficiency of the reference pulse attack as the ratio of the original secure information leaked to Eve with and without attack:
The following section reports the results of the phase noise reduction due to attack and efficiency of the attack under different LLO-CVQKD system conditions.
Performance Analysis

Excess noise tolerance
We investigate the attack performance as a function of various reference channel attenuation factors, , ranging from the vacuum channel (0dB/km) to conventional SMF (0.2dB/km). We also consider a practical scenario where the reference channel uses recently reported hollow-core fibre of 0.14dB/km attenuation coefficient [30] . The simulation parameters are designated as the same as in Sec 2.2 to provide optimal performance. Values are expressed in shot noise units. According to the Eq. (22), the phase excess noise tolerance increases with increase in transmission distance, decrease in reference path's attenuation coefficient, and drop with the reference pulse intensity. However, the too large reference pulse intensity also has negative impact on key rate as we discussed previously. In normal case, Alice and Bob will pick the optimal reference pulse intensity without the consideration of our attack. Consequently, we investigate our attack performance at the optimal reference intensity. Fig. 5 shows the variation in phase excess noise tolerance with different attenuation coefficients of the reference channel for a 20 km LLO-CVQKD link at = 100 . Attack works for any channel attenuation factor and the phase noise reduces by 60.2% and 24.1% from the initial value, for α = 0dB/km and 0.14dB/km reference channels, respectively. Fig.6 shows the variation in mutual information as a function of transmission distance, with optimal reference pulse intensity, under trusted phase noise model. The values are only evaluated for theoretical minimum α = 0 dB/km (blue dashed line) and practical minimum 0.14 dB/km (red dashed line).
, is evaluated with reference path attenuation coefficient α = 0.2 dB/km (purple solid line) under the notion that the attack is undetectable to Alice and Bob so channel attenuation coefficient for signal and reference channels are equal. The mutual information between Alice and Bob, I (black solid line), monotonically decreases as a function of channel length. The secure region under attack is labelled as the truly secure region while the yellow region is the insecure region estimated by Alice and Bob with and without attack. The white region referred as the attack induced insecure region where Eve is successful in her attack without revealing her presence. At relatively long distances, this grows rapidly which indicates an increase in attack efficiency. We need to emphasize that the value varies with system parameters and a 100% insecure key situation can be achieved, especially at long transmission distance. It is noted that the achievable secure distance under trusted noise model without attack is 99.1km. Attack with lossless reference channel, unity attack efficiency reduces it to 23.8km. In more practical sense, the maximum transmission distance is reduced to 32.0km in reference channel with 0.14dB/km loss. This indicates significant attack impact in the practical LLO CVQKD systems. 7 compares the performance of the untrusted phase noise LLO-CVQKD system performance with the trusted LLO-CVQKD system under reference pulse attack, at 20km transmission distance. At 20km there is no secure key generation possible for untrusted noise LLO-CVQKD system. However, we use this situation to show merits of trusted noise model. In Fig.7(a) , for untrusted phase noise model, it shows the χ is greater then I that lead to zero key rate. On the other hand, for trusted phase noise model, Fig.7(b) , since the calibrated esti ξ is excluded from excess noise estimation, the mutual information between Alice and Bob I is always stays higher than Eves' information upper bound. However, the attack on reference pulse increase the Holevo bound for Eve's information which estimated by Alice and Bob as (blue dashed line) but, accounts to (red dashed line). This creates an attack-induces insecure region. Quantitatively, at a 20 km distance and for 0dB/km attenuation coefficient for the reference channel, Eve can extract 48.6% of the secret key without the attack being identified. For a feasible 0.14 dB/km attenuation coefficient, Eve can achieve 23.2% additional information. The attack reduces the key rate, however, there exist at secure region that sill can be exploited for key generation. This indicates the potentiality of trusting the phase noise to improve key rate as well as transmission distance. The feasibility of trusted phase noise model is investigated in next section. 
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